


Report on USA

USA is ranked at fifth position on the 2011 Financial Secrecy Index. This ranking is based on a combination of its secrecy score and a scale weighting based on its share of the global market for offshore financial services.

USA has been assessed with 58 secrecy points out of a potential 100, which places them which places them in the mid range of the secrecy scale (see chart 1 below).

USA accounts for slightly over 21 per cent of the global market for offshore financial services, making it a huge player compared with other secrecy jurisdictions (see chart 2 below).



Part 1: Telling the story

The United States offshore financial centre: history and overview

Overview

The United States is the world's largest economy and its main financial centre in Wall Street is, on some measures, the world's biggest. It provides secrecy for non-residents, both at a Federal level and at the level of individual U.S. states. Taken as a whole, the United States provides a very wide range of offshore services. To a large extent, the government has encouraged many of these developments to attract capital for balance of payments reasons.

In terms of size, the U.S.' main rival as a financial centre is the City of London. However, unlike the City, which historically built its strength on overseas empire and has always been a heavily outward-focused (hence offshore) financial centre, the financial markets of the United States were significantly more domestically focused, and diluted in a relatively much larger economy. As a consequence, offshore finance – both in terms of U.S. persons using foreign secrecy jurisdictions, as well as foreigners using the U.S. itself as a secrecy jurisdiction - has always been more politically contested in the United States than it has been in the UK. In general, the United States has played a pioneering role in devising ways to defend itself against foreign tax havens, but has largely failed to address its own role in attracting illicit financial flows and supporting tax evasion.

The United States is a major tax haven because it provides tax free treatment and various forms of secrecy for nonresident individuals, corporations and other entities. On the tax side, it charges a zero rate on some categories of income, including interest paid by banks and savings institutions to non-resident individuals or foreign corporations; interest on government debt and interest on some types of corporate debt. On the secrecy side, the U.S. also has weak and relatively few treaty requirements to exchange relevant information with other jurisdictions – which need that information so that they can tax their own citizens properly. The U.S. government also does not require income earned locally by nonresidents to be reported to the U.S. government – which means that even where it may be required to exchange the information under international agreements, it doesn't have it available to exchange.

Furthermore, U.S. money laundering laws allow U.S. financial institutions to handle the proceeds of a long list of crimes, as long as those crimes are committed outside the U.S. If the crimes are committed inside the U.S., handling these proceeds would fall foul of money laundering laws. ([p186-9](#)) A significant share of U.S. residential and commercial property is owned by offshore shell companies, under secrecy arrangements that can help non-resident foreigners earn income that can be kept secret from the tax and criminal authorities of their home country.

These factors, which help the United States attract foreign dirty money, are significantly the result of deliberate lawmaking rather than of mere omission: they represent the classic behaviour of a secrecy jurisdiction. Financial secrecy provided by the U.S. has caused untold damage to the ordinary citizens of foreign countries, whose elites have used the United States as a bolt-hole for looted wealth.

Federal-level secrecy: from before globalisation to the present day

The United States has long been something of a secrecy jurisdiction or tax haven. Around the time of the 1921 Revenue Act, the U.S. House Ways & Means Committee, in a clear statement of tax-haven intent, stated that "the exemption of ... interest from taxation would be in keeping with the action of other countries and would encourage nonresident alien

individuals and foreign corporations to transact financial business through institutions located in the United States." Later, in 1966, the tax-exemption stance was officially reconsidered but nothing was done, on the grounds that it might, as one Senate report put it: "have a substantial adverse effect on our balance of payments."

On the secrecy side, information-sharing arrangements were extremely rudimentary in the early decades of the last Century. After the Second World War John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the main architects of the Bretton Woods agreements, fought to boost transparency by requiring the United States to inform European governments about the assets and income of their respective citizens, to help those war-ravaged countries raise sufficient tax revenues. These proposals, driven primarily by concerns that economic crisis could deliver European countries into Soviet hands, were eviscerated by the American Bankers' Association ([p74-76](#)): in the IMF's Articles of Association, co-operation on flight capital would no longer be 'required' as Keynes and White wanted, but merely 'permitted.'

The United States' offshore status really took off during the period of rapid financial globalisation from the Reagan era onwards.

Several factors spurred the changes. New Deal regulations (which had kept financial interests in check following the Great Depression) began to unravel; and financial deregulation and advances in communications technology accelerated cross-border financial flows, spurring offshore banking generally. Meanwhile, foreign tax havens increasingly began to serve as near-frictionless conduits for financial inflows into and out of Wall Street, making them one of the biggest reasons for the growth in the power and reach of Wall Street. The lure of Tax Haven USA as a magnet for illicit inflows further spurred the growth of the financial sector.

In 1970s the U.S., hitherto a country with external surpluses, began to face growing deficits, exacerbated by the Vietnam War. It increasingly needed foreign financing to finance these deficits and it did so, in significant part, by attracting tax-evading and other illicit foreign money. Foreigners invested in the U.S. for many reasons, not least the fact of the U.S. dollar being the global reserve currency - but secrecy and tax-free treatment was always among the top reasons. Had the U.S. implemented full transparency and taxed interest and other income earned by foreign investors, the financial inflows (and U.S. external deficits) would have been very substantially smaller.

In 1981, the U.S. introduced a new mechanism in the field of financial regulation: the International Banking Facility. This allowed banks in the U.S., which had previously needed to go offshore to get around domestic financial regulations, to keep a separate set of books that effectively allowed them to obtain these exemptions while remaining at home. This attracted significant funds [out](#) of foreign tax havens and back to the US.

In ongoing efforts to fill the deficits, the U.S. authorities began to let foreigners who lent to U.S. corporations and to the U.S. government a tax exemption on the U.S.' 30 percent withholding taxes when they received their interest payments. Initially they did this by

tolerating a convoluted loophole involving the Netherlands Antilles, but this messy mechanism was replaced in 1984 with a more direct tax haven offering: the so-called Portfolio Interest Exemption, under which nonresidents could invest directly in U.S. markets and receive interest payments tax-free, and typically in secrecy. [Time Magazine](#) accurately summed up this move: “Suddenly America has become the largest and possibly the most alluring tax haven in the world.” It was another major fillip for the growing power of Wall Street.

Occasional efforts have been made to step back from provisions that would reduce the United States’ role as a tax haven – though usually these were defeated by the power of Wall Street (and other) lobbyists. Federal-level regulations in January 2001, in the final days of the Clinton administration, would have required banks in the U.S. to inform the IRS about all bank interest paid to nonresident individuals: reporting that was already required for residents of the U.S. and Canada. Had this become law, they would still have been very narrow: the regulations did not require the U.S. to share the information with other foreign countries: just to have it available; it also only involved bank interest paid to individuals: other forms of investment income were excluded.

Under the George W. Bush administration there was a dramatic change in attitude, encapsulated in the words of Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill. When asked to respond to estimates that fewer than 6,000 of over 1.1 million offshore accounts and businesses were properly disclosed, [O’Neill responded](#): “I find it amusing.” Treasury withdrew the already narrow Clinton-era proposed regulations in July 2002 and replaced them with even narrower ones only requiring this information to be reported for residents of 16 designated countries: Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. (These countries, it seems, were the ones willing to exchange information reciprocally with the U.S.) These proposed regulations were also never implemented.

The U.S. carefully protects itself from foreign tax havens, while remaining a tax haven for foreigners

While content to let foreigners use the United States as a tax haven, the U.S. has always been concerned that U.S. taxpayers might evade taxes by *pretending* to be foreigners – disguising their identities through offshore tax havens or otherwise – and to evade U.S. taxes. So in 2001 the United States enacted the so-called Qualified Intermediary (QI) programme. The basic idea was to help the U.S. government ferret out U.S. tax cheats, while preserving the U.S. as a secrecy jurisdiction for foreigners. It was a rather devious and sophisticated form of secrecy, which works as follows.

If the U.S. had simply asked foreign financial institutions to report on all income originating in the U.S., then it would have received a lot of information not only about potential U.S. tax

cheats, but also about foreign tax cheats. Once it had this information, its treaties might oblige it to share this information with foreign governments.

So instead it *outsourced* the collection of information to banks and other financial institutions: in theory, they would collect the information, keep it outside the United States, then pass only the information about U.S. residents to the U.S. authorities, while screening out all the information about foreigners. This way, the U.S. authorities would never receive information it might be required to share with others. (Note that this is broader than the proposed 2001 and 2002 regulations, above: it involves not just bank interest but a wide range of income-generating assets.) This legislation was classic, deliberate, carefully crafted tax haven behaviour. David Rosenbloom, a top tax lawyer with inside knowledge of the drafting of this legislation, explained ([p136](#)) that the original intent may have been even worse:

“It’s not clear to me that the QI program is well adapted to the objective of ferreting out Americans – that is not how it started at all. The program was not aimed at identifying Americans. The program was aimed at protecting the identity of foreigners while allowing them to invest in the US,’ he said. ‘Making sure that Americans weren’t in the picture was part of it, but the real focus was on this competitive aspect abroad.’”

The programme functioned poorly even on its own terms, for the simple reason that financial institutions, such as Swiss banks, could not be trusted: subsequent criminal probes into UBS and other banks revealed that some banks had simply lied, blatantly hiding their tax-evading U.S. customers.

The QI program was overtaken by the so-called Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA, see [here](#)), enacted into law in March 2010, to come into force on January 1, 2013. This was essentially a tightened-up version of the QI program, preserving its essential tax haven structure as described above, but expanding its scope. In a testament to FATCA’s potential strength, Senator Carl Levin said in July 2011 that foreign banks were engaging in a “massive lobbying effort” to dilute it.

New legislation introduced in July 2011 under Senator Levin’s [Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act](#), not yet enacted, would further tighten up FATCA by, among other things, establishing legal presumptions to overcome secrecy barriers, closing loopholes, allowing a range of sanctions against non-cooperative jurisdictions; introducing country-by-country reporting requirements for multinationals, and strengthening penalties against promoters of abusive schemes. It would also create a tougher environment for people and entities doing business with foreign banks that reject FATCA, and would, crucially, let the U.S. Treasury to take action against financial institutions by extending anti money laundering tools into the tax area.

State-level facilities

Laws of incorporation in the United States are governed by state, rather than federal law. Several states have grown to specialise in hosting corporations that provide secrecy.

There is no exact 'date' when this business started: by and large it has simply been the result of omission: a prolonged failure to enact active legislation that would require transparency, and the exploitation of these gaps by private operators. State officials began seriously marketing state-based secrecy arrangements internationally from the period of globalisation in the 1970s and 1980s (see [here](#), for an example of Delaware's prosletysing for secrecy in Asia in 1986.) A few states such as Delaware, Wyoming and Nevada took an early lead in offshore secret incorporations, and remain leaders today.

Almost two million corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs) are formed in the United States each year, without the states asking for the identity of the owners. Many serve legitimate purposes but many, in the words of [Senator Carl Levin](#), "function as conduits for organised crime, money laundering, securities fraud, tax evasion, and other misconduct." Professional nominee companies provide nominee officers and directors serving as fronts for the real owners. Nominees may provide their own name and social security number to the authorities to obtain a company bank account or obtain an Employer Identification Number from the IRS - but having this information available gets you no closer to the real owners, who will frequently be protected behind attorney-client privilege and perhaps further secrecy layers and structures created elsewhere, often in foreign secrecy jurisdictions.

Company formation businesses boast of being able to set up anonymous companies in hours, sometimes for as little as \$100, with no meaningful review. States offer artificially aged "shelf companies" – companies you can buy off the shelf with a long-established history and impeccable credit record, providing a veneer of undeserved credibility. Companies offer not only nominee services but also local telephone listings and live receptionists, to give a veneer or probity and solidity. U.S. Senator [Norm Coleman](#) notes:

"That these formation and support services rival those offered in some of the most notorious offshore tax and financial secrecy havens is simply unacceptable."

A Department of Justice report revealed, for example, that anonymously-held shell companies in Pennsylvania and Delaware were used to unlawfully divert millions in international aid intended to upgrade the safety of former Soviet nuclear plants.

Only limited progress has been made in tackling these arrangements. Bearer shares were outlawed in the last two U.S. states (Nevada and Wyoming) in February 2007, following concerns about terrorist financing. In June 2011 Senators Chuck Grassley and Carl Levin introduced the [Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act](#) which would, if enacted, require states to obtain appropriate and updated beneficial ownership information about companies formed under state laws, and provide it under a subpoena or summons. This is hugely welcome legislation but it is still limited: even if this were enacted,

foreign jurisdictions chasing illicit money would still need to go through potentially complicated court procedures to obtain the information they need. It has, predictably, been countered by a powerful lobbying counter-drive from the financial services industry and other intermediaries.

Nevada and Wyoming, two of the biggest offenders in this area, [indicated](#) in late 2011 that they intended to crack down on secrecy business run out of their states. No concrete action has yet been seen, however.

Read More

Reuters has provided some useful case studies of state-level secrecy arrangements in its Shell Games series: see their stories on [Chinese Reverse Mergers](#), on [Wyoming](#) and on [Nevada](#).

Any number of stories exist about the U.S. being used as a secrecy jurisdiction by foreigners. One of the most egregious ones is the case of U.S. bank Wachovia in helping Mexican drugs gangs launder the proceeds of hundreds of billions of dollars. Read about it [here](#) and [here](#).


Read Treasure Islands, particularly pp124-146 of the [UK edition](#), and pp107-128 of the [U.S. edition](#).

Next steps for USA

The USA's 58 per cent secrecy score shows that it must still make major progress in offering satisfactory financial transparency¹. If it wishes to play a full part in the modern financial community and to impede and deter illicit financial flows, including flows originating from tax evasion, aggressive tax avoidance practices, corrupt practices and criminal activities, it should take action on the points noted where it falls short of acceptable international standards. See part 2 below for details of the USA's shortcomings on transparency. See this link <http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/kfsi> for an overview of how each of these shortcomings can be fixed.

Part 2: Secrecy Scores

The secrecy score of 58 per cent for the USA has been computed by assessing the jurisdiction’s performance on the 15 Key Financial Secrecy Indicators, listed below.



The numbers on the horizontal axis of the bar chart on the left refer to the Key Financial Secrecy Indicators (KFSI). The presence of a blue bar indicates a positive answer, as does blue text in the KFSI list below. The presence of a red bar indicates a negative answer, as does red text in the KFSI list. Where the jurisdiction’s performance partly, but not fully complies with a Key Financial Secrecy Indicator, the text is coloured violet in the list below (combination of red and blue).

This paper draws on key data collected on the USA. Our data sources include regulatory reports, legislation, regulation and news available at 31.12.2010². The full data set is available [here](#)³. Our assessment is based on the 15 Key Financial Secrecy Indicators (KFSIs, below), reflecting the legal and financial arrangements of the USA. Details of these indicators are noted in the following table and all background data can be found on the [Mapping Financial Secrecy web site](#)⁴. This data is the basis on which the [Financial Secrecy Index](#)⁵ is compiled.

The Key Financial Secrecy Indicators and the performance of the USA are:

| TRANSPARENCY OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP – USA | |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | Banking secrecy: Does the jurisdiction have banking secrecy? USA does not adequately curtail banking secrecy |
| 2. | Trust and Foundations Register: Is there a public register of Trusts and Foundations? USA does not put details of trusts on public record |

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 3. | Recorded Company Ownership: Does the relevant authority obtain and keep updated details of the beneficial ownership of companies? USA does not maintain company ownership details in official records |
| KEY ASPECTS OF CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY REGULATION – USA | |
| 4. | Public Company Ownership: Does the relevant authority make details of ownership of companies available on public record online for less than US\$10? USA does not require that ownership of companies is put on public record |
| 5. | Public Company Accounts: Does the relevant authority require that company accounts are made available for inspection by anyone for a fee of less than US\$10? USA does not require that company accounts be available on public record |
| 6. | Country-by-Country Reporting: Are companies required to comply with country-by-country financial reporting? USA partly requires country-by-country financial reporting by companies⁶ |
| EFFICIENCY OF TAX AND FINANCIAL REGULATION – USA | |
| 7. | Fit for Information Exchange: Are resident paying agents required to report to the domestic tax administration information on payments to non-residents? USA does not require resident paying agents to tell the domestic tax authorities about payments to non-residents |
| 8. | Efficiency of Tax Administration: Does the tax administration use taxpayer identifiers for analysing information effectively, and is there a large taxpayer unit? USA uses appropriate tools for effectively analysing tax related information |
| 9. | Avoids Promoting Tax Evasion: Does the jurisdiction grant unilateral tax credits for foreign tax payments? USA avoids promoting tax evasion via a tax credit system |
| 10. | Harmful Legal Vehicles: Does the jurisdiction allow cell companies and trusts with flee clauses? USA does allow harmful legal vehicles |
| INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND COOPERATION – USA | |
| 11. | Anti-Money Laundering: Does the jurisdiction comply with the FATF recommendations? |

| | |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | USA partly complies with international anti-money laundering standards |
| 12. | Automatic Information Exchange: Does the jurisdiction participate fully in Automatic Information Exchange such as the European Savings Tax Directive? USA does not participate fully in Automatic Information Exchange |
| 13. | Bilateral Treaties: Does the jurisdiction have at least 60 bilateral treaties providing for broad information exchange, covering all tax matters, or is it part of the European Council/OECD convention? As of June 30, 2010, USA had at least 60 bilateral tax information sharing agreements complying with basic OECD requirements |
| 14. | International Transparency Commitments: Has the jurisdiction ratified the five most relevant international treaties relating to financial transparency? USA has partly ratified relevant international treaties relating to financial transparency |
| 15. | International Judicial Cooperation: Does the jurisdiction cooperate with other states on money laundering and other criminal issues? USA partly cooperates with other states on money laundering and other criminal issues |

¹ Our definition of financial transparency can be found here:

<http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/PDF/FinancialTransparency.pdf>.

² With the exception of KFSI 13 for which the cut-off date is 30.6.2010. For more details, look at the endnote number 2 in the corresponding KFSI-paper here:

<http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/PDF/13-Bilateral-Treaties.pdf>.

³ That data is available here: http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/sj_database/menu.xml.

⁴ <http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com>.

⁵ <http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/>.

⁶ While the Dodd-Frank-Act requiring partial country-by-country and project-by-project disclosure for companies active in the extractive industries and listed on US stock exchanges became law in 2010, the regulations implementing the details of the law are still being written. Therefore, the ultimate effectiveness of these disclosure requirements remains uncertain.